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The purpose of this article is to investigate whether the notion of an interest should be 
taken at least as seriously as the notion of a right. It will be argued that it should; and 
not only because it can be just as amenable to the institutional taxonomical structure 
often said to be at the basis of rights thinking in law but also because the notion of an 
interest has a more epistemologically convincing explanatory power with respect to 
reasoning in law and its relation to social facts.  
 
 
Should jurists take the notion of an interest as seriously as the notion of a right? This 
article will argue that while the concept of a right has a powerful rhetorical value 
which should not be under-estimated, it actually is not a very helpful as an 
explanatory device with regard to the reasoning and methods to be found in common 
law cases. It can certainly express forcefully legal relations that have a strong 
persona-res property-like structure (quod nostrum est ± µZKDWLVRXUV¶ ± as a sixteenth 
century jurist put it), but it is less helpful when the focus of a claim is on, for example, 
the behaviour of a defendant and where the question is more realistically whether or 
not the claimant has a remedy given the facts in issue. An interest, while in many 
ways much less normative and more descriptive than a right, has the ability to be 
wide-ranging as an analytical tool that functions both within the law and within the 
facts. It can offer a means for bringing together different areas of law and different 
models of reasoning. 
 
 The purpose of this article is, then, to examine this legal notion that has not 
received much general attention, at least in recent years, in the United Kingdom 
literature. It will be examined mainly in the context of English law and this 
examination will be extended into some specific areas of difficulty. But the article 
will also have a comparative dimension since the concept has received some detailed 
attention on the continent.1 This comparative dimension will, to an extent, be 
harnessed to support the following thesis to be extracted from the analysis. This thesis 
is that the notion of an interest is, on the one hand, descriptively and explanatively a 
far more important concept than the notion of a right but, on the other hand, is, 
institutionally and conceptually speaking, no less a formal concept than a right. Given 
WKLV VWUDWHJLF SRVLWLRQ DQ µLQWHUHVW¶ FRXOG SURYLGH DQ H[FHOOHQW EHQFK-mark for 
assessing legal judgements and legal reasoning. 
                                                 
* Professor, Kent Law School ; Professor affilié, École de droit, Sciences Po, Paris. This article 
is a much re-orientated, and updated, adaption of a paper published a decade ago: G Samuel, 
The Notion of an Interest as a Formal Concept in English and in Comparative Law, in G 
Canivet, M Andenas & D Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law Before the Courts (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2004) 263. The author would like to thank the 
anonymous referees for their very helpful criticisms and observations on an earlier version of 
the manuscript. 
1
  In particular from Professor François Ost: F. Ost, Droit et intérêt: Vol 2 ± entre le droit et 
non-GURLW O¶LQWpUrW (Facultés Saint-Louis, Brussels, 1990). The present author would like to 




I INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS AN INTEREST? 
 
If one is to take interests seriously, the first and foremost question is one of definition. 
:KDW LVPHDQWE\ WKH WHUPµLQWHUHVW¶"$VZHVKDOO VHH WKLV LVE\QRPHDQVDQHDV\
question to answer. Yet if an interest is to be taken seriously it is important that the 
term is given some substance even if the substance itself turns out to be more flexible 
or fluid than the strict theorist would desire. This said, the notion of a right is no 
easier to define as a senior judge in the United Kingdom once observed.2 This 
difficulty of definition has not deterred rights theorists. 
 
(a) Rights thesis 
 
 The late Ronald Dworkin invited judges and jurists to take rights seriously.3 
Certainly his plea has been heeded in some quarters and there is now a body of jurists 
VSHFLDOLVLQJLQSULYDWHODZZKRKDYHDWWUDFWHGWKHQDPHµULJKWVWKHRULVWV¶$FFRUGLQJ
to Professor Steve +HGOH\WKHVHWKHRULVWV³UHJDUGWKHNH\TXHVWLRQLQREOLJDWLRQVFDVHV
DVWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKHSODLQWLII¶VULJKWDUJXLQJWKDWRQFHWKLVLVGRQHWKHDQVZHU
WR RWKHU TXHVWLRQV VKRXOG IDOO LQWR SODFH UDSLGO\ DQG XQFRQWURYHUVLDOO\´ 6XFK DQ
DSSURDFK³PLQLPLVHVUHIHUHQFHWRSROLF\FRQFHUQVZKLFKDUHVHHQDVREMHFWLRQDEOH´4 
 
 Like many theories, this rights thesis is challenging. In its purest form it is 
asserting that legal decision-making should be a matter of inference from an abstract 
FRQFHSWXDO PRGHO ZKLFK LV VXIILFLHQWO\ FRKHUHQW WR SHUPLW D µULJKW¶ WR EH LGHQWLILHG
either through its structural relation with other concepts suFKDV µGXW\¶ DQG µOLEHUW\¶
(the Hohfeld model)5 or through reference to a set of axiomatic rules or principles (the 
rule model).6 These axioms, according to the rights theorists, are the foundation of 
legal knowledge and are valid in themselves as law. As Kevin and Susan Gray have 
SXW LW D[LRPV ³DUH VLPSO\ LPPXQH IURP UDWLRQDO FKDOOHQJH´ DQG WR ³NQRFN DW DQ
axiom is to want to play a different game´.7 
 
 However, as a device through which one might understand legal reasoning and 
decision-making, a highly conceptual rights-based thesis has rather severe 
                                                 
2
  See Lord Oliver in In re KD (a minor) [1988] 1 AC 806, at 825. 
3
  R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977). 
4
  S Hedley, Looking Outward or Looking Inward? Obligations Scholarship in the Early 21st 
Century, in A Robertson & TH Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Hart, 2009) 193, at 196. 
5
  See eg R Stevens, The Conflict of Rights, in Robertson & Wu, op.cit, 139. 
6
  Perhaps the founder of this model is JG Heineccius, Elementa Juris Civilis Secundum 
Ordinem Pandectarum (Venice, 1785 edition) where in the preface (at xiii) he says that one 
must undertake careful research, find clear definitions and axioms; the necessary conclusions 
will then flow from these clearly defined axioms which can then be reduced to their principles 
(Reperies & hic jurium origines diligenter investigatas, reperies definitiones perquam 
perspicuas, axiomata clara, &, quae e definitionibus illis sua sponte fluunt; conclusiones 
denique necessaria,  ad sua quasque principia revocatas.). Here in essence is the idea of a 
conceptual model of axioms, analogous to mathematical constructions (mos geometricus), 
from which rights (iura) can be deduced. The idea of iura DV µULJKWV¶ KDG EHHQ FOHDUO\
expounded by an earlier jurist Hugues Doneau, Commentarii De Jure Civili.   
7
  K Gray & S Gray, The Rhetoric of Reality, in J Getzler (ed), Rationalizing Property, Equity 
and Trusts (Butterworths, 2003), 204, at 209. 
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limitations.8 For a start, it is a theory that simply does not fit all the cases in the law 
reports. Even if one confines oneself to English cases, they still reveal a range of 
different reasoning models some of which are not really very amenable to a rights-
analysis.9 This is not to say that such cases are incapable of being rethought or re-
presented in terms of the rights of parties;10 but such re-presentation will often shed 
little light on the reasoning model in play.11 Put another way, a rights thesis does not 
provide a convincing descriptive account of the legal reasoning in the law report 
texts.12 Another limitation is that while the rights thesis has a very solid historical 
foundation in the civil law this history turns out to be ambiguous. The kind of highly 
conceptual and coherent rights thesis that dominated thinking from the usus modernus 
pandectarum to the Pandectists is now largely seen to be a reasoning myth. Legal 
thinking during the twentieth century has, even in civil law world, largely been a 
reaction against what might be called mos geometricus (axiomatic) thinking.13 Thus 
the contemporary private law rights theorists run a serious risk of being seen as little 
more than a group attempting to recapture and revive a discredited past. Have not 
jurists like Jean Domat (1625-1696) and Joham Gottlieb Heineccius (1681-1741) said 
it all before (and perhaps more elegantly)? In short, a rights thesis is unable to 
explain, except by reference to some pre-existing conceptual model which itself has 
no epistemological validation other than its own existence, why the right should be 
recognised as a normative social factor.14 
 
(b) Defining an interest 
                                                 
8
  As indeed Gray & Gray illustrate with respect to land law decisions: see generally Gray & 
Gray, op.cit. 
9
  See generally G Samuel, A Short Introduction to Judging and to Legal Reasoning (Edward 
Elgar, 2016). 
10
  ³:KDWLVDQµLQWHUHVW¶",IWKHLQWHUHVWLVQRWOHJDOO\SURWHFWHGit is, in law, nothing. And if it is, 
LWLVDULJKW´WKLVTXRWDWLRQIURPDFLYLOODZZULWHULVTXRWHGE\3URIHVVRU2VWDWWKHRXWVHWRI
his monograph. As he says, it expresses the analytical positivism (dogmatiique juridique) of 
the traditional Belgian private lawyer: Ost, op.cit, at 9.  
11
  Samuel, Short Introduction to Judging, op.cit. 
12
  3HUKDSV LOOXVWUDWHG E\ WKH IROORZLQJ MXGLFLDO VWDWHPHQW ³In the pragmatic way in which 
English law has developed, a man's legal rights are in fact those which are protected by a 
cause of action. It is not in accordance, as I understand it, with the principles of English law to 
analyse rights as being something separate from the remedy given to the inGLYLGXDO´ Sir 
Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Kingdom of Spain v Christie, Mason & Woods Ltd [1986] 
1 WLR 1120, at 1129. 
13
  See eg J-L Bergel, Théorie générale du droit (Dalloz, 5th ed., 2012), at 307-309. See also J 
Gordley, The Jurists: A Critical History (Oxford University Press, 2013), at 275-281. One 
LPSRUWDQW FULWLF RI WKH µD[LRPDWLF¶ DSSURDFK ZDV WKH %HOJLDQ MXULVW Chaïm Perelman (1912-
1984): on which see S Goltzberg, Chaïm Perelman  /¶DUJXPHQWDWLRQ MXULGLTXH (Michalon, 
2013). 
14
  For example if one asserts that C has a right to X because D is under a duty to convey X to C 
this simply begs the question of why D is under a duty. Such a duty might be justified by 
reference to, say, a theory of justice but this theory itself begs a question. Why is this theory of 
justice epistemologically more valid than a theory that legal decisions should be motivated by 
policy concerns. Ronald Dworkin of course argued that unelected judges ought not to be 
concerned with policy issues, only with rights. But this just sends one back to the question of 
why rights are epistemologically valid. Is it because the right represents a social interest that 
the law is privileging or is it because the right forms part of some conceptual structure that the 
judge must construct in order to decide a hard case? Perhaps either of these approaches can be 
grounded in some constitutional and (or) moral theory; but, again, it is not clear why these 
theories might be epistemologically more valid than some theory grounded in social or policy 
considerations. See S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in 
Anglo-American Legal Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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 However one difficulty that has to be faced at the outset is how exactly an 
interest is to be defined. François Ost makes the point that the term is not only 
imprecise but is often used iQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ZLWKWKHZRUGµULJKW¶:RUVHLIRQHWULHV
to define it by looking at its opposite ± ZKDW LV WKH RSSRVLWH RI µLQWHUHVW¶" ± one 
equally gets nowhere.15 Nevertheless Peter Cane has suggested that it has two broad 
meanings. The first is used in WKHVHQVHRIDQµDVVHW¶ 
 
:KHQ ZH VSHDN RI VRPHRQH KDYLQJ IRU LQVWDQFH D µSURSHUW\ LQWHUHVW¶ ZH
mean that the person has some sort of claim over or right in some tangible or 
LQWDQJLEOH WKLQJ DQG ZKHQ ZH VSHDN RI VRPHRQH KDYLQJ D µFRQWUDFWXDO
LQWHUHVW¶ we mean that the person has some claim or right by reason of a 
FRQWUDFW,QVXFKLQVWDQFHVWKHZRUGµLQWHUHVW¶LVPRUHRUOHVVV\QRQ\PRXVZLWK
WKHZRUGV µULJKW¶RU µFODLP¶$Q LQWHUHVW LQ WKLV VHQVH UHODWHV WR RU LV µLQ¶RU
µRYHU¶VRPHWDQJLEOHRULQWDQJible thing such as property or contract. A useful 
JHQHUDOWHUPWRGHVFULEHWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURILQWHUHVWVLVµDVVHWV¶.16 
 
The second is more nebulous: 
 
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG ZH RIWHQ VSHDN RI D SHUVRQ¶V LQWHUHVWV RU RI WKH SXEOLF
interest in a broader sense to mean simply objectives or states of affairs which 
are« RUZRXOGEHWRWKHSHUVRQ¶VRUWKHSXEOLF¶VDGYDQWDJHIRUH[DPSOHWKH
public interest in the due administration of justice,« or the interest in free 
competition recognized in the defence of justification in the tort of 
conspiracy.17 
 
And Professor Cane concludes: 
 
:KLOH LW LV FOHDU WKDW ERWK W\SHV RI LQWHUHVW PD\ EH µOHJDO¶ LQ WKH VHQVH RI
µUHFRJQL]HG DQG SURWHFWHG E\ ODZ¶ LQWHUHVWV RI WKH IRUPHU W\SH DUH RQ WKH
whole, better protected than those of the latter type, at least in the sense that 
LQWHUHVWVRI WKH IRUPHU W\SHRIWHQFRQVWLWXWH OHJDO µVZRUGV¶ZKHUHDV WKRVHRI
WKHODWWHUW\SHDUHRIWHQRQO\HIIHFWLYHDVµVKLHOGV¶18 
 
One might add that Tony Weir once suggested that an interest lies midway between 
µULJKW¶DQGµGDPDJH¶³3HUKDSV´KHFRQWLQXHG³WKHUHODWLRQVKLSFDQEHSXWWKLVZD\
all rights, however infringed, involve liability; all legally protected interests, 
relevantly infringed, involve liability; but some damage (eg grief), however produced, 
GRHVQRWLQYROYHOLDELOLW\´19 
 
 So, what emerges from these observations? There are a number of meanings 
that attach to the notion of an interest. In real property law and perhaps in the law of 
contract the word interest is defined in terms of a legal entitlement, a ius as a civilian 
might put it, and so, as Professor Cane says, it is more or less interchangeable with the 
                                                 
15
  Ost, op.cit, at 11-12. 
16
  P Cane, Tort Law and Economic Interests (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1996), at 3-4. 
17
  Ibid, at 4. See also JF Lever, Means, Motives, and Interests in the Law of Torts, in AG Guest 
(ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 1961) 50, at 56-57. 
18
  Cane, op.cit, at 4. 
19
  T Weir, A Casebook on Tort (Sweet & Maxwell, 1967), at 3 
 5 
word right. 7KXV WKH /DZ RI 3URSHUW\ $FW  VWDWHV WKDW WKH ³only interests or 
charges in or over land which are capable of subsisting or of being conveyed or 
created at law are ´20 DQG WKDWDOO ³other estates, interests, and charges in or over 
land take effect as equitable interests´21 One can see here how the expression 
µLQWHUHVW¶LVEHLQJemployed as a legal term of art. 
 
 Secondly, it is used in an empirical sense to mean a state of affairs which is to 
the advantage of ± or at least of concern to ± a person or class of persons. For example 
in regulations dealing with misleading marketing, one provision states that before 
³JUDQWLQJDQLQMXQFWLRQWKHFRXUWVKDOOKDYHUHJDUGWRDOOWKHLQWHUHVWVLQYROYHGDQGLQ
SDUWLFXODU WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW´22 The foundation of an interest in this piece of 
legislation is very different from its use in real property law; it is a question of fact 
which requires the court to examine the concerns of all those likely to be affected by 
the granting or the withholding of a legal remedy. 
 
 Thirdly it is used as an expression that lies midway between a right and a 
situation where someone has suffered what might loosely be described as an 
identifiable disadvantage, such as the suffering of harm. The term interest is used here 
to categorise in an empirical sense the type of harm suffered. And so one might talk of 
DSHUVRQVXIIHULQJDQLQYDVLRQRIKHUµILQDQFLDOLQWHUHVW¶RUµPHQWDOKHDOWKLQWHUHVW¶DV
RSSRVHG VD\ WR VXIIHULQJ SK\VLFDO GDPDJH WR KHU µSURSHUW\ LQWHUHVW¶ RU µERGLO\
inWHUHVW¶:KDW LV XVHIXO DERXW WKLV DSSURDFK LV WKDW LW FDQKHOSTXDQWLI\ HPSLULFDOO\
different types of harm which in turn will facilitate the legal reaction to such types of 
harm. 
 
 It is evidently not easy to induce out of these three meanings (and they may 
not be exclusive) any single definition of the term interest. For the purposes of this 
present investigation, however, the expression will for the most part (but not 
exclusively) be employed primarily in the second sense outlined above. That is to say, 
it will be defined as meaning some state of affairs in which a person or class of 
persons ± or sometimes a non-SHUVRQLILHG µWKLQJ¶ res) such as the environment or 
justice ± has an advantage or a concern. This definition may on occasions draw into 
the meaning the third possibility outline above; that is to say it might treat this state of 
affairs described in terms of an interest as a half-way house between this factual 
situation (empirical) and a right (normative). 
 
(c) Advantages attaching to the notion of an interest 
 
 Whatever the difficulties, there are nevertheless quite a few reasons why an 
µLQWHUHVW¶ GHVHUYHV D PRUH GHWDLOHG DQDO\VLV ,W LV D QRWLRQ WKDW E\ LWV YHU\ QDWXUH LV
central to legal analysis since it is one that, like the legal subject (persona) or the legal 
object (res), exists at one and the same time in both the legal world and the world of 
social reality. It is, in other words, a truly mediating concept between fact and law. 
Secondly, it is a notion that goes back to Roman law and thus is a legal concept that 
should attract the attention both of the legal theorist specialising in epistemology and 
                                                 
20
  Section 1(2). 
21
  Section 1(3). 
22
  Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 reg 18(2). 
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of the comparative lawyer.23 Equally, and this is a third reason, it is a concept that 
FRQQHFWVZLWKDµULJKW¶$QLQWHUHVWRIWHQDSSHDUV, as we have mentioned, to be a kind 
of half-way house between a right and a remedy.24 The notion of an interest is, 
accordingly, a useful starting point for examining a range of other legal concepts. 
Fourthly, an interest is a notion that connects with the persona (legal subject) as an 
individual: to determine an interest, is to determine a legal subject and his, her or its 
expectations.25 An interest, then, is a legal concept that can play a central role in legal 
WKRXJKW DQG OHJDO UHDVRQLQJ LW LV D ³SDVVSRUW´ WR DOO DUHDV RI WKH ODZ26 Fifthly, in 
having its basic roots in the world of fact rather than in the normative abstraction of 
law, it is a concept that would appear to lie beyond the rule. It is a notion that, itself, 
suggests that legal knowledge is not exclusively rule-based. 
 
 Indeed, this factual dimension to the notion of an interest allows it to be used 
DV WKH EDVLV RI DQ µDFWLRQDO¶ VFKHPH RI LQWHOOLJLELOLW\,27 that is to say a scheme that 
µUHDGV¶ VRFLDO UHDOLW\ DV FRQVLVWLQJ RI LQGLYLGXDO DFWRUV DV WKH SULPDU\ XQLWV ,Q
economics it is a matter of self-interested actor.28 Because such an actor also has a 
role in the legal plan, the notion of an interest can act as a link between law and 
another discipline such as economics.29 Having said this, an interest can equally be 
used to help define a fragmented group that is not solid enough to be endowed with its 
own legal personality.30 For example one can talk of the interests of consumers or of a 
local community. Finally, therefore, the notion of an interest is a key means by which 
one can understand legal reasoning. It bridges the gap not just between legal 
substance and legal method, but equally between judgment and solution; it is the 
means by which one can have access to socio-legal ideas that lie behind the more 
formal elements of legal knowledge, that is to say behind rules and legal rights.31 It is, 
in brief, a key to legal knowledge. 
 
                                                 
23
  R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 
(Oxford, 1996), at 35-38, 826-827. 
24
  See eg Chief Constable of Kent v V [1983] 1 QB 34. 
25
  Jolowicz, op.cit. 
26
  Ost, op.cit., at 10-11. 
27
  This scheme is discussed in G Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and 
Method (Hart Publishing, 2014), at 88-89. 
28
  A. Leroux & A. Marciano, La philosophie économique (Presses Universitaires de France, 
1998), at 15-18. 
29
  See eg ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. 
30
  See JA Jolowicz, Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented and Collective Interests in Civil 
Litigation: English Law [1983] Cambridge Law Journal 222. 
31
  $QH[FHOOHQWUHFHQWH[DPSOHLVWREHIRXQGLQ/RUG6XPSWLRQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHVFRSHRIWKH
ex turpi causa UXOH³,QP\RSLQLRQWKHTXHVWLRQZKDWFRQVWLWXWHV³WXUSLWXGH´IRUWKHSXUSRVH
of the defence depends on the legal character of the acts relied on. It means criminal acts, and 
what I have called quasi-criminal acts. This is because only acts in these categories engage the 
public interest which is the foundation of the illegality defence. Torts (other than those of 
which dishonesty is an essential element), breaches of contract, statutory and other civil 
wrongs, offend against interests which are essentially private, not public. There is no reason 
in such a case for the law to withhold its ordinary remedies. The public interest is sufficiently 
served by the availability of a system of corrective justice to regulate their consequences as 
between the parties affected´Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2014] UKSC 55, at para 
28 (emphasis added). 
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 1RZWKHµDFWLRQDO¶VFKHPHVWURQJO\VXJJHVWVWKDWLQWHUHVWVtend to attach to the 
person: that is to say, that a person acts in his or her own best interests.32 This in turn 
might imply that the only way these interests could be modelled, given their number 
and variety, is through an alphabetical list. Yet the empirical orientation of an interest 
in fact permits it to be modelled through an institutional analysis. That is to say an 
interest lends itself to a schematisation first used by Gaius and then by Justinian in 
their Institutes and later adopted as the structural foundation for all the modern 
codes.33 Interest can be seen as a concept that attaches on occasions as much to 
µWKLQJV¶resDQGWRµDFWLRQV¶actiones) as to the persona. Thus one can talk, as has 
been seen, of having a legal interest in land or of an interest requirement which 
attaches to a particular kind of legal remedy (for example judicial review). 
 
 Of course, such interests can equally be seen as attaching to the person and 
indeed all interests, if regDUGHG DV µWKLQJV¶ FDQ EH UHGXFHG WR D VXEMHFW-object 
relationship. However the suggestion here is that interests can be seen not just as 
attaching to persons. They have an orientation as well which means that from an 
institutional position (persons, things and actions) there are interests which are 
orientated, or perhaps one might say as much attached to, things and to actions as they 
are to persons. The advantage of this institutional perspective is that it allows for an 
analysis of an interest from more RIDµWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDO¶PRGHOWKDQLVWKHFDVHZKHQ
interest is seen primarily from the position of the legal subject. It provides a 
perspective through which very different kinds of interest, or interest relationships, 
can emerge and as a result the institutional system is able to provide a useful 
conceptual starting point. Such a model functions in truth more as a half-way house 
between social reality and law and thus takes on the status of an object of legal 
science. Taken together, then, the notion of an interest and the institutional system 
provide a ± perhaps the ± PRGHO E\ ZKLFK VRFLDO IDFW DV µFRQVWUXFWHG¶ E\ WKH
institutional system itself (persons, things and legal actions), connects with law, also 
organised, at least on the continent, by the institutional plan.34 6RFLDOµUHDOLW\¶LQRWKHU
                                                 
32
  See on this aspect R von Jhering, Law as a Means to an End (Boston, 1913; trans I Husik) 
where he defines interest in terms of pleasure and pain (pp. 26- /DWHU KH VD\V ³1DWXUH
herself has shown man the way he must follow in order to gain another for his purposes: it is 
that of FRQQHFWLQJRQH¶VRZQSXUSRVHZLWKWKHRWKHUPDQ¶VLQWHUHVW. Upon this principle rests 
DOO RXU KXPDQ OLIH WKH 6WDWH VRFLHW\ FRPPHUFH DQG LQWHUFRXUVH´ S  1RWH DOVR 5RVFR
3RXQG¶VSUHIHUHQFHLQWHDFKLQJMXULVSUXGHQFH³WREXLOGRQ-KHULQJ¶VLGHDRILQWHUHVWVGHILQLQJ
them as claims or wants or desires (or, I like to say, expectations) which men assert de 
facto´53RXQGJurisprudence: Volume III (West, 1959), at. 15. On Jhering, see Gordley, 
op.cit, at 287-292. 
33
  On the institutional system and its development see P. Stein, The Development of the 
Institutional System, in P. Stein & A. Lewis (eds), Studies in Justinian's Institutes in memory 
of J. A. C. Thomas (Sweet & Maxwell, 1983), at. 151-163; P Stein, The Character and 
Influence of the Roman Civil Law (Hambledon, 1988), at. 73-82. See also G. Samuel, The 
Foundations of Legal Reasoning (Maklu, 1994), at. 171-190. 
34
  See further, G Samuel, Classification of Obligations and the Impact of Constructivist 
Epistemologies (1997) 17 Legal Studies 448. Roman law used this plan only for teaching 
purposes and thus the great practitioner work, the Digest, does not employ the scheme at all. 
The first jurist to rethink the Digest in terms of the institutional plan was Hugues Doneau 
(1527-1591). His Comementarii de jure civili runs to 28 volumes and was probably unfished 
at the time of his death. Doneau also, as has been mentioned, rethought the Digest from the 
YLHZSRLQW RI D VXEMHFWLYH µULJKW¶ µZKDW LV RXUV¶ DQG µZKDW LV RZHG WR XV¶ A much more 
precise restatement of the civil (Roman) law, although not actually along institutional lines, 
was produced by the French jurist Jean Domat (1625-1696): Les loix civiles dans leur ordre 
naturel (first edition 1689). This was important because it built upon the idea that Roman law 
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words, starts its connection with legal discourse through the notion of an interest; and 




II INTERESTS ATTACHING TO THE PERSONA 
 
The Digest of Roman law begins its analysis of law with the ius personarum on the 
ground that law is made for the sake of mankind.36 Given that the Digest also says 
that law is about the protection of interests (utilitates),37 the persona equally acts as a 
good starting point for the examination of the notion of an interest. Indeed one might 
say that the law is made for the protection of personal interests with the result that if a 
person goes missing his or her interests remain in existence in need of protection by 
another persona.38 
 
(a) Personality and best interests 
 
 These interests are of course wide ranging and varied and if one wished to 
analyse all the various types and classes one would be in effect studying the whole 
mass of laws themselves.39 However the general point to be made about the notion of 
an interest in relation to the institution of the persona is that it can act as a vehicle for 
giving expression to the idea of personality itself. It can do this in two main ways. 
First, the notion of an interest can be used to give form WR LQWDQJLEOH µWKLQJV¶ WKDW
attach intimately to the conception of a person.40 Perhaps the two best examples to be 
IRXQG LQ )UHQFK ODZ DUH GLJQLW\ DQG SULYDF\ WKHVH DUH QRW SDUW RI D SHUVRQ¶V
patrimony and so do not fall into the category of the law of property. They are very 
much part of the law of persons.41 These interests of personality do not, accordingly, 
attract a monetary value as such and they cannot (in theory) be traded.42 Now the fact 
                                                                                                                                            
FRXOG EH UHVWDWHG LQ WHUPV RI IXQGDPHQWDO SULQFLSOHV +HLQHFFLXV¶ axiomata). However 
+HLQHFFLXV¶ ZRUN WKRXJK PXFK PXFK VKRUWHU WKDQ 'RQHDX¶V Commentarii nevertheless 
followed the old order of the Digest. Domat rearraQJHGWKHµD[LRPV¶LQWRDWZRSDUWVWUXFWXUH
consisting of engagements and succession (des successions), although in the opening general 
part he sees law consisting of general rules (and their interpretation), persons and things. 
Domat is, then, probably thH WUXH µIDWKHU¶ RI WKH PRGHUQ FLYLO FRGHV &RQWHPSRUDU\ ULJKWV
theorists in the common law world are really attempting to read cases in much the same way 
as Doneau, Domat and Heineccius read the Digest; they are hoping to extract from them (or 
those that they approve) a conceptual model (axiomata). 
35
  This is not to argue that the common law is fully amenable to the civilian institutional 
analysis. In many ways it is not. But the common law does share the basic institutions of 
person (legal subject), thing (legal object) and remedy (legal action) with the civilian systems. 
Cf G Samuel, A Short Introduction to the Common Law (Edward Elgar, 2013), at 104-108. 
36
  D.1.5.2. 
37
  D.1.1.1.2. 
38
  Code civil. art 117. 
39
  Which is in effect what Pound does and this is one reason why his Jurisprudence covers five 
volumes. 
40
  ³,QGLYLGXDO LQWHUHVWV DUH FODLPV RU GHPDQGV RU GHVLUHV LQYROYHG LQ DQG ORRNHG DW IURP WKH
standpoint of the individual life immediately as such -±DVVHUWHGLQWLWOHRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOOLIH´
Jurisprudence III, op.cit., at 23.  
41
  Code civil.. arts 9 (privacy), 16 (dignity). 
42
  Ost, op.cit., p 122. Note however if these interests are invaded damages are awarded often via 
Code civil.. art 1382 and to this extent they thus appear as patrimonial interests. Note for 
example in English law the Human Organs Transplants Act 1989 s 1. 
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that they are given specific protection in the Code civil obviously has the effect of 
endowing privacy and dignity with the status of rights rather than just interests.43 But 
as Professor Ost points out, despite this status, there are still hesitations in as much as 
the code is by no means clear as to how these rights are to be protected.44 They are not 
like obligation or property rights that are given direct protection in the law of 
actions;45 LQVWHDGWKH\DUHPRUHOLNHµLQWHUHVWV¶ZKLFKFDQEHWUHDWHGDVµSDWULPRQLDO¶LI
they are invaded.46 
 
 7KLV µSDWULPRQLDO LQWHUHVW¶ DVSHFW LV ZHOO EURXJKW RXW E\ DQ (QJOLVK FDVH
concerning an elderly Norwegian man who suffered a severe stroke while in 
England.47 $GLVSXWHDURVHEHWZHHQWKHIDPLO\RIWKHPDQDQGWKHPDQ¶VFORVHIULend: 
the family (defendants) wanted the man returned to Norway for care while the friend 
(plaintiff) wanted the man to be treated in an English private nursing home. Given the 
fact that the man himself was unable to communicate, the whole reasoning process 
KDG WR VKLIW IURP µULJKWV¶ WR µLQWHUHVWV¶:KDWZDV LQ WKH µEHVW LQWHUHVWV¶ RI WKHPDQ
KLPVHOI"'LGHDFKRIWKHSDUWLHVKDYHDµOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW¶LQWKHOHJDOGLVSXWH":LWK
UHVSHFW WR WKH VHFRQG TXHVWLRQ 0LOOHW /- ZDV RI WKH YLHZ WKDW ³XQOHVV WKH FRXUt is 
willing to entertain proceedings brought by the parties who claim the responsibility 
IRUORRNLQJDIWHUWKHSDWLHQWLWZLOORIWHQQRWEHSRVVLEOHWREULQJSURFHHGLQJVDWDOO´
$QG WKLVZRXOGEHXQIRUWXQDWH VLQFH ³WKHSDUWLHV DUH OLNHO\ WR UHVRUW WR VHOf-KHOS´48 
This second question is essentially one where the interest attaches to the actio rather 
than the persona, but while the case is very much a law of persons problem, the 
inability of the right-holder himself to assert his rights in court creates structural 
problems. As Professor Ost recognises with regard to the civil law tradition, the 
notion of a right is extremely ambiguous as a practical reasoning device when taken 
out of its property context.49 It simply does not function properly when applied to 
µULJKWV¶RISHUVRQDOLW\VLQFHWKHLGHDRIEHLQJWKHPDVWHURIRQH¶VRZQERG\GRHVQRW
always find expression in legal structures.50 What one is really talking about, says Ost, 
LVWKHSURWHFWLRQWKURXJKDYDULHW\RIPHDQVRIDµVLPSOHLQWHUHVW¶7KLVPD\ seem a 
rather extraordinary conclusion given the importance, in the scale of legal values, of 
the human body. Human rights are fundamental51 and one of the most fundamental of 
these human personality rights is the right to life. Yet even here the English case law 
indicates that institutionally this can often be handled only by recourse to the notion 
of an interest.52 
                                                 
43
  This idea of personality rights goes back to Doneau: Commentarii, op.cit, Book 1, Chapter 1, 
para 3. Doneau does not list privacy but he does mention dignity (existimatio). 
44
  Ost, op.cit., pp. 117-124. 
45
  Thus, in the civil law, property rights are protected by actions in rem and obligational rights 
by actions in personam. 
46
  Cf Protection of Harassment Act 1997 s 3. 
47
  ,QUH6+RVSLWDO3DWLHQW&RXUW¶V-XULVGLFWLRQ [1995] 3 WLR 78. 
48
  At 92. 
49
  Ost, op.cit., at 122. 
50
  7KH 5RPDQV VDLG WKDW RQH LV QRW RZQHU RI RQH¶V RZQ OLPEV DQG DV D UHVXOW D IUHHPDQ
negligently injured did not at first have a claim for damage to his body: D.9.2.13pr. However 
such an important interest was not in the end left unprotected: D.9.1.3. 
51
  Human Rights Act 1998. 
52
  What the notion of an interest does in this situation is not so much to give effect to some pre-
existing claim or demand or expectation existing empirically (although these must have some 
basis in fact). It gives an alternative and objective view of the conceptual (institutional) 




 In the Tony Bland case the courts were asked to rule, in an action for a 
declaration, if a hospital could discontinue a life support programme for a young man 
who, as a result of the dreadful Hillsborough tragedy, was rendered permanently 
unconscious with, according to medical opinion, no chance of recovery.53 In short, 
could the hospital allow the young man to die by withdrawing the feeding necessary 
to keep him functioning in his vegetative state? One might have thought that the 
starting point for this legal action would have been the right to life that attaches to the 
human persona, yet this was not the concept that formed the basis of the reasoning 
and the decision.54 Instead the judges focused on the notion of an interest and asked 
ZKDW ZRXOG EH LQ WKH µEHVW LQWHUHVWV¶ RI 7RQ\ %ODQG 7KH UHDVRQ IRU WKLV VKLIW RI
emphasis becomes evident when one considers the final decision reached in the case: 
the House of Lords came to the conclusion that it would be in the best interests of 
Bland if he were to be allowed to die.55 Had the judges approached this case in terms 
of rights, it would have been extremely difficult to conclude that Bland should be 
allowed to die since this would have appeared to contravene his fundamental human 
right to life.56 The notion of a right would have emphasised the persona. However in 
UHSODFLQJ µULJKW¶ ZLWK µLQWHUHVW¶ WKH ODZ\HUV ZHUH DEOH WR HIIHFW D VKLIW IURP WKH
subjective to the objective.57 Tony Bland became, to use the expression of Millet LJ in 
WKHFDVHGLVFXVVHGHDUOLHUDQDORJRXVWRDµVDFNRISRWDWRHV¶ZKRVHµLQWHUHVWV¶ZHUHWR
be considered detached from the persona itself.58 
 
(b) Interests rather than rights 
 
 A second way in which the notion of an interest can give expression to the 
idea of personality is through the specific recognition of an interest, or set of interests, 
existing independently of the legal status of the subject him or herself. Thus in the 
area of family law children are deemed to have their own interests which are to be 
treated independently from, say, the interests of the parents;59 and since Roman times 
these interests come into existence before the actual legal personality of the child 
itself.60 The concept of an interest and the notion of a persona are therefore not 
interdependent in quite the same way as rights and legal personality. This décalage 
allows the notion of an interest to be extended beyond human legal subjects in a way 
that would be controversial if it were rights rather than interests that were in issue. For 
example legislation can talk about the interests of animals without raising the kind of 
philosophical controversy that would inevitably result had the text talked in terms of 
rights.61 
                                                 
53
  Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
54
  See now on the relationship between the right to life and the interest of the patient: NHS Trust 
A v M [2001] 2 WLR 942. 
55
  2QHPLJKWQRW WKDW WKHGHFLVLRQDOVRVHUYHG WKHµEHVW LQWHUHVW¶RI WKHKRVSLWDO WUXVWJLYHQ WKH
ILQDQFLDOFRVWRI NHHSLQJ%ODQGDOLYH2QHFRXOGFHUWDLQO\ WDON LQ WHUPVRI%ODQG¶V µULJKW WR
GLH¶EXW LWZRXOGQRW UHDOO\KDYHEHHQ IHDVLEOH RU WDVWHIXO WR WDON LQ WHUPVRI WKHKRVSLWDO¶V
µULJKWV¶ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKLVSDWLHQW 
56
  Cf Ward LJ in In re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] 2 WLR 480 
at 537. 
57
  See also Mental Capacity Act 2005 s 4. 
58
  ,QUH6+RVSLWDO3DWLHQW&RXUW¶V-XULVGLFWLRQ [1995] 3 WLR 78. at 94. 
59
  Ost, op.cit., at. 73-80; In re L (A Child) [2001] 2 WLR 339. 
60
  D.1.5.7. 
61
  Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 s 5(3)(c). 
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 This ability to extend beyond the existence of the persona is particularly 
useful when it comes to interests that attach more to groups of human beings rather 
than just to the individual. These interests are often, to begin with at least, rather 
diffuse and may well remain legally unrecognised until given shape by attachment to 
some, perhaps equally diffuse, legal subject.62 /HJDOµVXEMHFW¶LQWKLVFRQWH[WPXVWEH
understood in two rather different ways. The first way is simply as a category and thus 
the interest in issue is one that attaches to a category of persons; one talks here of 
µLQWHUHVWJURXSV¶/HJLVODWLRQLVIXOORIH[DPSOHVRQHUHFHQWWH[WOLVWVYDULRXVLQWHUHVWV
groups as including teachers, employers of teachers, providers of teacher training and 
so on.63 $QRWKHU$FWWDONVRIWKH³LQWHUHVWVRIORFDOJRYHUQPHQWLQGXVWU\DJULFXOWXUH
DQGVPDOOEXVLQHVVHV´64 ZKLOH\HWDQRWKHUSLHFHRIOHJLVODWLRQPHQWLRQV³SHUVRQVDEOH
to represent the interests of particular kinds of litigants (for example, businesses or 
HPSOR\HHV´65 It would be a gross exaggeration to say that the existence of these 
various interests has the effect of creating new legal subjects. Accordingly the 
capacity of, say, a local authority to obtain an injunction in the interests of the local 
inhabitants does not as such turn the local community into a legal person.66 
Nevertheless local government, agriculture, small businesses, teachers, employers and 
employees are interest groups that often find it valuable to create specific legal 
persons or associations which to act as a focal point for the representation of their 
interests. Indeed, even if such groups lack any kind of legal personality, procedural 
rules may nevertheless give indirect recognition.67 Sometimes these associations 
become so prominent that they change the symmetry of the law itself. The creation of 
trade unions and employers associations had the ultimate effect of creating a new 
category of law: labour law is now a subject independent of the law of obligations.68 
 
 
III INTERESTS ATTACHING TO THE RES 
 
Interests can also attach to ± or be more orientated towards ± a res. In property law, as 
we have seen, WKH WHUP µLQWHUHVW¶ LV XVHG WR GHVFULEH D SHUVRQ¶V VSHFLILF OHJDO
relationship with an object of property; lawyers in the common law world talk of a 
person having a legal interest in a piece of property, a fund or even a chattel. Here the 
term is being used not in its descriptive sense, but, as was mentioned in the 
introduction, in the sense that is often much closer to WKDW RI D OHJDO µULJKW¶ LQ WKH
SURSHUW\$V3HWHU&DLQSXWLWWKHLQWHUHVWFDQEHPRUHRUOHVVGHILQHGDVDQµDVVHW¶ 
 
                                                 
62
  See generally JA Jolowicz, op.cit. 
63
  Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 s 1(6). 
64
  Pollution Prevention and Control Act 1999 s 2(4)(c). 
65
  Civil Procedure Act 1997 s 6(2)(f). 
66
  Local Government Act 1972 s 222. 
67
  See further Samuel, A Short Introduction to the Common Law, op.cit, at 120-121. 
68
  In this respect the Pound thesis of pre-existing interests ultimately recognised by the law and 
given expression in legal rights or powers has much to commend it. There is no doubt that 
these interests can be said, in some form, to pre-exist empirically. All the same, the role of the 
institutional system must not be underestimated either; the conceptual formation of new 
interest groups goes far in itself in giving substantive content to the interests in as much as the 
law creates an institutional model in which these interests seemingly find expression. One is 
no longer focusing on the sociological facts as the foundation of the interest but the 
institutional model and as such the law will have as much input into the model as any social 
fact.  
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(a) Legal interests in property 
 
 The term interest is used in its most formal property sense in land law. The 
µULJKWV¶UHIHUUHGWRLQVection 1(2) of the Law of property Act 1925 are not referred to 
DVµHVWDWHV¶LQODQG± these are dealt with by section 1(1) ± EXWµLQWHUHVWV¶RUµFKDUJHV¶
7KHVH µLQWHUHVWV¶FDQEH DQDO\VHGDVZLWKDQ\ OHJDO µULJKW¶E\ UHIHUHQFH WRSRVLWLYH
rules of land law and in this context they lose, if not all, certainly part of their 
descriptive character. In other words, the notion of an interest can in this context to be 
defined, at the outset, as a normative concept. However on closer examination the 
position tuUQV RXW WR EH PRUH FRPSOH[ VLQFH DQ µLQWHUHVW¶ LQ DQRWKHU¶V SURSHUW\ FDQ
include a possessory relationship and possession is a relation said to have its root 
more in fact than in law.69 Thus if someone finds an item of property in the street and 
takes it hoPHLWFDQEHDVVHUWHGWKDWWKHILQGHUKDVWDNHQµSRVVHVVLRQ¶RILW0RUHRYHU
WKHILQGHUFRXOGHYHQDVVHUWWKDWKHKDVDQµLQWHUHVW¶LQWKHWKLQJWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWLILW
were to be stolen from his house he could go some way in claiming a relationship 
with the item were the police to recover it.70 Of course the legal analysis cannot, and 
does not, stop at this descriptive stage; it has to go on to decide whether the finder 
has, as a result of his former possessory relationship with the thing, an entitlement to 
it. Should the original owner arrive at the police station to assert his legal title this 
would no doubt destroy any normative entitlement ± RUµULJKW¶± that the finder might 
KDYHKDG%XWZKDWLIQRRZQHUFRXOGEHWUDFHG",WPD\EHWKDWWKHILQGHU¶VSRVVHVVRU\
µLQWHUHVW¶ ZRXOG HQWLWOH KLP WR the thing over and above any other citizen (save of 
course the original owner).71 In other words he would have a right to possession and 
this turns possession ± and the interest that attaches to it ± into a normative concept.72 
 
 The switch from the descriptive to the normative is usually effected through 
the legal actio ± the finder will bring an action against the person in actual possession 
± and this will force a court into deciding who has the best right to possession.73 One 
might accordingly see the problem as one of an interest attaching not so much to the 
thing but to the remedy. This analysis is of particular importance when it comes to 
equitable remedies and so, for example, a person who has contracted to buy land will 
be able to claim specific performance of the contract should the seller refuse to 
perform.74 A contract right in effect becomes a right to the thing itself and thus a kind 
of property right. However not all equitable remedies that are concerned with property 
actually attach to the res itself; some are personal and therefore are not equivalent to 
interests in property. For example if a householder obtains an injunction against a 
neighbour ordering the latter not to play loud music in the middle of the night this 
equitable remedy will be in personam (against the neighbour in person) and will not 
DWWDFKWRWKHQHLJKERXU¶VODQGin rem). 
 
(b) Property interest conflicting with other interests 
 
                                                 
69
  D.4.6.19. 
70
  FH Lawson & B Rudden, The Law of Property (Oxford University Press 3rd ed, 2002), at 64-
65. 
71
  Parker v British Airways Board [1982] Q.B. 1004. 
72
  Lawson & Rudden, op.cit, at 65. The expression ius possessionis is even to be found in the 
Roman sources: D.41.2.44pr. 
73
  See eg Waverley BC v Fletcher [1996] QB 334. 
74
  Lawson & Rudden, op.cit., at 59, 84-85. 
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 Nevertheless an injunction can create what might be called a weaker interest 
with respect to property. In Wandsworth LBC v A75 a local authority obtained an 
injunction, on the grounds of her abusive behaviour, against a parent excluding her 
from entering the school where her child was being educated. On appeal the Court of 
Appeal discharged the injunction because the local authority had not given the parent 
an opportunity to be heard before excluding her from the school. Buxton LJ, 
GHOLYHULQJWKHMXGJPHQWRIWKH&RXUWVDLGWKDW³WKHORFDODXWKRULW\KDVDQREOLJDWLRQLQ
public law to educate their children´ ZKLOH WKH ³SDUHQW KDV D FRUUHODWLYH LQWHUHVW LQ
VHHLQJWKHGXWLHVRIWKHDXWKRULW\SURSHUO\SHUIRUPHG´7KLVGRHVQRWJLYHWKHSDUHQWD
³ULJKW WR LQWHUIHUH ZLWK KRZ WKH SURIHVVLRQDO HGXFDWRUV XQGHUWDNH WKHLU ZRUN EXW LW
does give him an interest in being informed about their work, with the possibility of 





 2QHPLJKWQRWHKHUHWKDW WKHNH\FRQFHSW LV WKHµLQWHUHVW¶7KHSDUHQWDV WKH
court stressed, does not have any rights as such, but she does have an interest that puts 
her in a different class than other visitors. Arguably this interest is descriptive in as 
much as it arises simply out of the fact that the child is attending the school, but its 
quasi-normative dimension is equally relevant. This quasi-normativity does not, of 
course, result from any relationship with the school property and thus is a legal 
UHODWLRQVKLS ZKLFK LV FRPSOHWHO\ LQGHSHQGHQW IURP WKH ORFDO DXWKRULW\¶V SURSULHWDU\
(ownership) relationship with the land. However it does nevertheless raise an 
interesting question about the extent to which public law (imperium) can impinge 
upon private law dominium7RZKDWH[WHQWGRHVµLQWHUHVW¶DFWDVDPHDQVRIWXUQLQJD
FHQWUDODUHDRISULYDWHODZWKDW LV WRVD\ WKHODZRISURSHUW\ LQWRDIRUPRI³TXDVL-
SXEOLF´ODZ"7KHSRLQWLVDQLPSRUWDQWRQHEHFDXVHµLQWHUHVW¶FRXOGLQWKLVVLWXDWLRQ
end up as the foundation for the only viable means of establishing a balance between 
the exercise of the private power of dominium and the constitutional and 
administrative control of such power.  
 
 The problem has been investigated by two leading property lawyers who 
indicate, clearly, how, without proper consideration being given to principles of 
public law and their relationship with principles of private law, the exercise of 
dominium can lead to constitutional injustice.77 The transfer of a public monopoly into 
the private arena, which in legal terms means a shift from imperium to dominium, has 
dramatic effects at the level of legal concepts since the transfer puts the corporation 
beyond the reach of judicial review. How are the interests of citizens to be equally 
translated? Kevin and Susan Gray give the example of the privatised water company 
DEOH WRDFTXLUH ODQGE\FRPSXOVRU\SXUFKDVH LQ WKH µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ZKLFK LQ WXUQ
allows the private company to further its own commercial interest (private profit) at 
the expense of those individuals forced to give up their homes at below commercial 
value prices and at much inconvenience.78 The so-called public and the commercial 
interest are advanced at the expense of the individual interest. The reverse side of this 
                                                 
75
  [2000] 1 WLR 1246. 
76
  At 1253. 
77
  K. Gray & S. Gray, Private Property and Public Property in J. McLean (ed), Property and the 
Constitution (Hart, 1999), at 11-39. 
78
  Ibid., at. 37. 
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argument can be seen when private individuals, employed to run private companies 
operating a public service like the railway, are given huge bonuses. Here the private 
interest profit is justifieG EHFDXVH LW ZLOO DFW DV ³DQ LQFHQWLYH WR GR ZHOO´ WKXV
presumably, enhancing the public interest.79 The point to be made here is that the 
notion of an interest, rather than a right, more readily highlights the problem in issue. 
 
 
IV INTERESTS ATTACHING TO THE ACTIO 
 
The notion of an interest can attach ± or again be orientated towards ± not just to the 
person and to a thing but also to the legal remedy which gives it an important role in 
procedural law. Again the point must be stressed that such remedy-orientated interests 
can of course be seen as interests equally attaching to a person. What is being argued 
is that it is more helpful from an analytical, and legal reasoning, point of view to 
regard them as attaching to the remedy rather than to the person. 
 
(a) Interest and procedure 
 
 This procedural point is not new and has in fact a history stretching back to the 
Roman actio popularis. These popular actions were theoretically available to any 
member of the public and could be brought, for example, against an owner of a 
building adjacent to a highway from which something had been thrown or poured 
causing injury to highway users.80 Being public penal actions they were designed to 
protect the public interest (utilitas publica) in using the streets without danger,81 but 
those with a particular interest (interest) in bringing the action would be given 
preference to sue.82 
 
 This idea of restricting legal actions only to those with a legitimate interest in 
the proceedings has been developed into a general principle within the civil law 
tradition: SDVG¶LQWpUrWSDVG¶DFWLRQ.83 In other words a plaintiff who wishes to bring, 
or defend, an action in the civil courts must either have a legitimate interest in the 
success or failure of the proceedings or be a person given power by statute to 
vindicate or defend a specified interest.84 Thus it was once the situation in French law 
that an unmarried partner who had lived with a fatally injured victim of a tort could 
not sue the tortfeasor because the partner lacked a legitimate interest in the actio.85 
This interpretation has now been abandoned, but what is interesting about the 
legitimate interest requirement is that it can act as the basis for both a narrow and a 
wide view of liability. It can restrict the number of plaintiffs able to sue when it 
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attaches to the persona, but of course can increase the types of damage (that is to say 
interests) legitimately protected.86 
 
 Probably a similar rule exists in English law in respect of civil proceedings,87 
DOWKRXJK RI FRXUVH FRQFHSWV VXFK DV µGXW\ RI FDUH¶ RU WKH UHTXLUHPHQW RI GDPDJH
often fulfil the same role and thus make superfluous any legitimate interest 
provision.88 However statute now confers on a number of public officers or bodies the 
power to seek certain remedies on behalf of specified interests89 and this statutory 
power has been extended to the Consumers Association in respect of unfair terms in 
consumer contracts.90 Yet whatever the position with regard to English private law 
and legal remedies, in public law the interest rule is quite specific. A person wishing 
WREULQJDQDFWLRQIRUMXGLFLDOUHYLHZPXVWKDYHD³VXIILFLHQWLQWHUHVW´LQWKHPDWWHU91 
In other words, in public law, the law of actions is kept separate from substantive law 
exclusively through the use of the notion of an interest. An individual is entitled to 
FRPPHQFHDMXGLFLDOUHYLHZDFWLRQRQO\LIKHKDVD³VXIILFLHQWLQWHUHVW´DQGWKLVPXVW
ORJLFDOO\EHVHSDUDWHIURPWKHVXEVWDQWLDOSXEOLFODZµULJKW¶WKDWZill be in issue in the 
judicial review claim itself.92 
 
(b) Procedural interests and substantive rights 
 
 Care must thus be taken, if the distinction between right and interest is to have 
DQ\FRQFHSWXDOPHDQLQJ WRNHHSµLQWHUHVW¶VHSDUDWHIURPµULJKW¶ ,Icare is not taken 
here, the law of actions issue will soon become at least partly merged with the 
substantive law question. And the result will be that the question whether or not a 
private person can bring a legal action will become very close to depending upon the 
actual substance of the claim itself.93 7KH UHTXLUHPHQW RI µVXIILFLHQW LQWHUHVW¶ FDQ
accordingly, easily transform itself into a kind of public law preliminary question of 
ODZRUDSXEOLFODZVWULNLQJRXWDFWLRQHLWKHUUDLVLQJµLQWHUHVW¶HIIHFtively to the status 
RI µULJKW¶RU UHGXFLQJ µULJKW¶ WR OLWWOHPRUH WKDQ DQ LQWHUHVW94 Such a transformation 
would be an error in as much as the purpose of the requirement is the exclusion of 
potential claimants on the ground that there is an insufficient connection between 
persona and actio. The locus standi question is not really something that goes to the 
lawfulness of an administrative decision. Such a requirement is no doubt necessary 
with regard to certain kinds of remedies where individual damage is not a 
precondition since it would probably introduce into law an unacceptable insecurity if 
everyone had the right to challenge in court an unlawful act of another.95 Nevertheless 
the notion of sufficient interest might go well beyond the descriptive in as much as it 
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can raise a question as to whether a particular interest group ought to be regarded, in 
effect, as a legal subject. This can become acutely conceptual in that it raises on 
occasions the question of whether a group of persons add up to more than the sum of 
the individuals. 
 
 Take for example a government minister who makes an unlawful decision that 
has consequences for the environment but does not actually invade the individual 
interest of any single individual. According to one judge the mere assertion of an 
LQWHUHVWGRHVQRWJLYHRQHDQ LQWHUHVW7KXV WKH³IDFW WKDW VRPH WKRXVDQGVRISHRSOH
join together and assert that they have an interest does not create an interest if the 
individuals did not have aQLQWHUHVW´96 Perhaps not, but the position is more complex 
than the judge seems to suggest. A wine distributor sells as litre bottles of wine bottles 
that in fact contain only 98 centilitres and secures for itself a huge profit. No single 
consumer suffers any measurable loss as far as the law is concerned, yet the buyers as 
a class have been deprived of a large amount of money. The same applies with respect 
to the environment. It may be that an unlawful decision by a minister, or an unlawful 
act by a commercial organisation, causes no measurable invasion of any individual 
interest, but this does not mean that a class of persons will be unaffected. If the 
commercial organisation profits from its unlawful act it will, without doubt, have 
advanced its commercial interest. Is one forced to say that this advance is cost-free 
since no individual interest is affected? What if a group of drugs companies launch 
onto the market at the same time, and at great profit to themselves, a drug that is 
dangerous? Does one have to wait for an individual consumer to suffer before one can 
say that consumers as a class has had its interest threatened?97 
 
 
V ABUSE OF A RIGHT AND LEGITIMATE INTEREST 
 
None of what has already been said should be taken as asserting that there are never 
occasions when the notion of an interest, at the level of the remedy, should not be 
used to outflank a right. Indeed, it has already been noted that in civil law systems a 
right holder is entitled to sue only if there is a legitimate interest in the proceedings. 
Often, by definition, if the right-holder is seeking to vindicate his right this in itself 
will provide the interest. However there are occasions when it could be said that a 
right-holder has no interest in enforcing his rights. 
 
(a) Are rights absolute? 
 
 The French Code civil lays down in one of its most famous articles (article 
WKDW³RZQHUVKLSLVWKHULJKWWRHQMR\DQGWRGLVSRVHRIWKLQJVLQWKHPRVWDEVROXWH
PDQQHU´%XW WKHCour de cassation KDVVWDWHGWKDW WKLVµDEVROXWHULJKW¶ LVVXEMHFW WR
WKHOLPLWDWLRQWKDWLWFDQEHH[HUFLVHGRQO\LQVDWLVIDFWLRQRID³VHULRXVDQGOHJLWLPDWH
LQWHUHVW´98 Thus a landowner who grew two metre high ferns on her land with the sole 
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purpose blocking out the light of her neighbour was held to have committed a tort and 
declared liable in damages to her neighbour.99 The basis of this action for damages 
ZDV QRW WKH LQWHUIHUHQFH ZLWK WKH QHLJKERXU¶V SURSHUW\ RU FRQWUDFWXDO ULJKW IRU WKH
neighbour did not have as such a right to light. It was the malicious behaviour of the 
ODQGRZQHUZKLFKGHSULYHGWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKHULJKWWRJURZSODQWVRQRQH¶VODQGRILWV
legitimate interest. In an earlier case the French Supreme Court had made a similar 
ruling with respect to a landowner who had erected sixteen metre towers on his land 
WRSSHG ZLWK VSLNHV ZLWK WKH GHOLEHUDWH LQWHQWLRQ RI LQWHUIHULQJ ZLWK KLV QHLJKERXU¶V
ballooning activities. These towers went way beyond anything needed to protect the 
ODQGRZQHU¶V ³OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVWV´100 The importance of the two cases is that they 
established the doctrine of abuse of rights based on the relationship between 
VXEMHFWLYHµPDOLFH¶DQGREMHFWLYHµLQWHUHVW¶101 
 
 The theory of abuse of rights did not confine itself to the law of property but 
expanded into other areas of private law.102 Again these developments involved the 
notion of an interest. In the area of family law, for example, abuse of family property 
rights by a spouse might be curtailed where the interest of the family was 
threatened.103 And in contract the theory, along with good faith,104 helped develop the 
idea that each party to a contract had to consider not just their own commercial 
interests but the legitimate interests of the other contracting party. It is a question of 
WKH µFRPPRQ LQWHUHVW¶105 In company law the rights and interests of shareholders 
might well take second place to the interests of the company as a whole (at least in the 
civilian tradition).106 
 
 What is so important about this civilian development is that while it is clearly 
something that focuses on the concept of a right, the actual vehicle by which the 
theory of abuse of right has been put into effect is the notion of an interest. As 
Professor Ost has stated, its positive influence is incontestable. Sometimes an interest 
acts as a means of curbing an excess of selfish individualism such as where the group 
interest takes precedence over that of the individual. Sometimes it insures the stability 
of contract by stressing the common interest of the two or more parties.107 These 
developments have not, it must be said, occurred without severe criticism from those 
who considered that the doctrine of abuse of rights amounted to the undermining of 




(b) Liberty, expectations and interests 
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 7KLVDELOLW\RIDQLQWHUHVWWRZHDNHQWKHQRWLRQRIDµULJKW¶JRHVVRPHZD\LQ
explaining why the notion of a subjective right has never had the same force in 
English law as it has had on the continent.109 English law has thought more in terms 
of liberty rather than rights; and liberty, as Ost explains, is at the basis of the notion of 
an interest.110 This lack of rights-thinking in English law has resulted equally in a lack 
of any formal theories of abuse of rights. Problems that would be treated as an abuse 
of a right in civil law tend, in England, to be solved on the basis of the law of actions 
(remedies) which in turn look to behaviour and reasonableness. A reasonable level of 
noise may become an unreasonable interference with a property interest if the noise is 
the result of a malicious motive.111 In public law, equally, the emphasis is not on the 
rights of citizens, but on what they might reasonable expect from a public service.112 
%XW VXFK D µOHJLWLPDWH H[SHFWDWLRQ¶ FDQ QHYHUWKHOHVV IXQFWLRQ PRUH RU OHVV DV D
µOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW¶ZLWKWKHUHVXOWWKDWDSXEOLFERG\ZLOOQRWEHDEOHWRHQIRUFHDQ\
of thHLU µSULYDWH¶ ODZ SURSHUW\ RU FRQWUDFW ULJKWV LI LW ODFNV D SURSHU LQWHUHVW LQ LWV
exercise.113 These abuse cases do not in strict theory draw their normative force as 
such from the motive of the defendant since motive has been said to be irrelevant 
when it comes to the exercise of a property right.114 The normative force in these 
cases comes from the existence of a cause of action or a remedy like judicial review. 
This creates a rather complex picture because motive gets relegated to a seemingly 
more indirect role. A contractor may not be granted his full right to damages if the 
µH[SHFWDWLRQ LQWHUHVW¶ WKDW KH LV SHUKDSV XQUHDVRQDEO\ LQ WKH H\HV RI WKH MXGJHV
asserting, is according to the court not the actual interest in play.115 
 
 The question is whether one can go further and use the notion of an interest as 
a positive means of remedial intervention. A person exercises a legitimate liberty 
deliberately to interfere with a legitimate interest of another: will a remedy be 
available to the person whose legitimate interest is invaded? This question takes us to 
the heart of the relationship between rights, remedies and interests, for if a court is 
prepared to grant a remedy it would immediately seem to flow, logically, that the 
interest is being transformed into a protected right.116 It is this bootstraps circularity 
that gives legal reasoning its force as an informal source of law. 
 
 In particular the interest approach has been used to support the granting of 
injunctions. On one occasion a defendant was restrained from doing an act, not itself 
wrongful, simply because it interfered with the commercial interest of the plaintiff 
without furthering, according to the court, any interest on the part of the defendant.117 
On another occasion the Court of Appeal was prepared to restrain a defendant from 
exercising his liberty to use the highway on the basis that he may be tempted to 
LQYDGH WKH µOHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW¶ RI WKH SODLQWLII LI KH ZHUH DOORZHG WR DSSURDFK WKH
YLFLQLW\ RI WKH SODLQWLII¶V KRPH118 In this latter case the starting point was the 
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relationship between the power of the High Court to grant and injunction119 and the 
³QHHGWRSURWHFWWKHOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVWVRIWKRVHZKRKDYHLQYRNHGLWVMXULVGLFWLRQ´120 
2QFHDJDLQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VµULJKW¶WRXVHWKHKLJKZD\ZDVUHGXFHGWo an interest with 
WKH UHVXOW WKDW WKH FDVH EHFDPH RQH RI ³WZR LQWHUHVWV WR EH UHFRQFLOHG´ 7KH
UHFRQFLOLDWLRQZDVWKHQDFKLHYHGE\UDLVLQJWKHSODLQWLII¶VµOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW¶ WR WKH
VWDWXVRID ULJKWDQG WR UHGXFH WKHGHIHQGDQW¶V WR WKDWRID³OLEHUW\´ ZKLFK³PXVWEH
respected up to the point at which his conduct infringes, or threatens to infringe, the 
ULJKWVRIWKHSODLQWLII´121 Finally the liberty and right dichotomy was reduced to one 
of mutual legitimate interests: in restraining the defendant from temptation the court 
ZDV QRW RQO\ DFWLQJ ³LQ WKH SODLQWLII¶V LQWHUHVW´ EXW DOVR ³LQGLUHFWO\ WKH
GHIHQGDQW¶V´122 None of this is to suggest that the Court of Appeal was wrong to 
grant an injunction on the facts of this case. The point is simply that the source of the 
law is in the circularity of the reasoning and in the manipulation of concepts like 
µLQWHUHVW¶ DQG µULJKW¶ 7KHUH DUH RFFDVLRQV LQ RWKHU ZRUGV ZKHUH VXFK ERRWVWUDS
reasoning can amount to law-making in way that has little to do with the application 
RIUXOHV7KHVRXUFHRIODZLQWKLVFDVHZDVDQµLQWHUHVW¶EXWDQLQWHUHVWWKDWH[LVWHGDV
much in the reasoning process as in any social reality.123 Ex iure utilitas oritur. 
 
 
VI DAMAGES AND INTERESTS 
 
We have seen that interest attaches to ± or is orientated towards ± an actio in two 
main ways. It provides a formal link between persona and actio for the purposes of 
actionability and the role here is essentially procedural. It can also act as a substitute 
µULJKW¶ ZKHUH LWV UROH LV WR SURYLGH D VXEVWDntive dimension to the availability of a 
remedy. Does the plaintiff have a legitimate interest in need of protection by the 
court? 
 
(a) Categorising harm 
 
 There is however a third, although not unrelated, way in which an interest 
attaches to a remedy. In damages actions the notion of an interest is used as a means 
of giving expression to, and categorising, different types of harm suffered by a 
plaintiff. This damages role has been well described by the late Tony Weir: 
 
To cause harm means to have an adverse effect on something good. There are 
several good things in life, such as liberty, bodily integrity, land, possessions, 
reputation, wealth, privacy, dignity, perhaps even life itself. Lawyers call these 
JRRGV ³LQWHUHVWV´ 7KHVH LQWHUHVWV DUH DOO JRRG EXW WKH\ DUH QRW DOO equally 
good. This is evident when they come into conflict (one may jettison cargo to 
save passengers, but not vice versa, and one may detain a thing, but not a 
person, as security for a debt). Because these interests are not equally good, 
the protection afforded to them by the law is not equal; the law protects the 
better interests better: murder and rape are, after all, more serious crimes than 
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theft. Accordingly, the better the interest invaded, the more readily does the 
law give compensation for the ensuing harm.124 
 
One can see from this passage why it is tempting to reduce the whole of the law to a 
PDWWHU RI µLQWHUHVWV¶125 Law is about the SURWHFWLRQ RI µJRRGV¶ RU WKH DYRLGDQFH RI
harm, and these goods or harm can be divided up, as Weir observed, into interests. 
Again this is an analysis that has its foundation in Roman law. In an action for the 
wrongful killing of a slave, the question arose as to the amount of damages that 
should be payable to the owner: is it just the value of the slave as a thing or is the 
RZQHUHQWLWOHGWRDYDOXHEDVHGRQWKHRZQHU¶VµLQWHUHVW¶LQWKHVODYHQRWEHLQJNLOOHG"
The response was in favour of the latter: et hoc iure utimur, ut eius quod interest fiat 
aestimatio.126 
 
 This Roman contribution to the law of damages was of importance for two 
UHDVRQV )LUVW LW SURYLGHG D µVFLHQWLILF¶ PHDQV RI DVVHVVLQJ FRPSHQVDWLRQ GDPDJHV
would be payable only if an interest could be identified and valued.127 µ,QWHUHVW¶ LQ
other words, was the means by which one could link descriptive categories of harm to 
normative principles of what a defendant ought to pay. Secondly, it provided a means 
of giving concrete expression to intanJLEOH µJRRGV¶ VXFK DV ORVV RI DQ H[SHFWHG
profit,128 RU LQWDQJLEOH µKDUPV¶VXFKDVGHSUHFLDWLRQRIDFROOHFWLYHJURXSRIREMHFWV
through the destruction of a single item.129 µ,QWHUHVW¶ LQ WKLVVHQVHEHFDPHDIRUPRI
property, an intangible thing (res incorporalis) that in turn endowed the whole idea of 
an obligation with its proprietary character.130 These ideas in turn helped transform 
the law of delict (tort) from a quasi-criminal law of actions, where a person who had 
caused harm paid a fine or penalty, to a law of actions founded on a relationship 
between two individuals where the idea was to re-establish harmony between two 
SDWULPRQLHV 7KH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH QRWLRQ RI DQ µLQWHUHVW¶ it could be said, was 
synonymous with the development of a more sophisticated private law.131 
 
(b) Debt, damages and interest 
 
 These Roman developments went far in transforming the notion of an interest 
from being an analytical device attached to the actio to a form of property ± or at least 
µYDOXH¶± seemingly capable of existing independently from the remedy. This is most 
evident perhaps with respect to a claim for a debt. At one level this is simply an 
HQWLWOHPHQWWRDUHPHG\EXWDWDQRWKHUOHYHOLWLVDµWKLQJ¶WKDWLVWRVD\DQDVVHWWREH
entered as a credit in the creditoU¶V SDWULPRQ\ ,Q PRGHUQ FRPPRQ ODZ D GHEW LV D
IRUP RI SURSHUW\ DSWO\ HQWLWOHG D µWKLQJ LQ DFWLRQ¶ FKRVH LQ DFWLRQ DQG WKLV LV RQH
reason why Lord Denning MR was able to conclude that a third party ± who 
according to the established law could obtain no µULJKWV¶IURPDFRQWUDFWEHWZHHQWZR
others ± was entitled to enforce her right to a debt even although she was not a party 
to the contract creating the debt.132 Moreover she was entitled to sue because she had 
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D ³OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW´ WR HQIRUFH LW133 Of course, a right to damages for a slave 
wrongfully killed or stolen by the defendant might not as such be as much of a res as 
the slave had been when alive or in the claimant¶V SRVVHVVLRQ %XW PHWDSK\VLFDOO\
speaking the right to damages comes very close to being a form of property in itself. 
Both are capable of being valued in monetary terms and thus both are able to be called 
µLQWHUHVWV¶DVZHKDYHVHHQ IURP7RQ\:HLU¶VREVHUYDWLRQ ,Q IDFW WKLV UHGXFWLRQRI
physical things to mere interests is post Roman since it is clear that the Roman jurists 
distinguished between the thing itself (res) and the interest (id quod interest) which 
attached to it.134 And one might note, also, how Weir himself advocated that tort 
lawyers should continue to distinguish between physical things and money. The 
³GHIHUHQFH RI ODZ\HUV WR HFRQRPLVWV´ KH ODPHQWed ³LV RQH RI WKH PRVW FKLOOLQJ
examples of trahison des clercs LQWKHODWHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\´135 Needless to say, the 
central concept used in economics is the notion of an interest.136 
 
 ³/HJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW´ PD\ WKHUHIRUH EH D PHDQV RI stimulating a remedy in 
VLWXDWLRQVZKHUHWKHUHZDVQROHJDOµULJKW¶7KHFODVVLFH[DPSOHLVZKHUHRQHSHUVRQLV
able to obtain damages for the invasion of an interest attaching to another person. This 
is a problem that can arise as a result of what civil lawyers call the relative effect of 
contract (or privity of contract in the common law). Thus in Roman law where a party 
promised for something to be given or done on behalf of another no binding 
obligation arose since each party must promise only for himself.137 The empirical 
basis for this lack of an obligation was quite clearly stated to be the absence of any 
interest; it is of no interest to a promisor that something be done in the interest of 
another.138 However the logic of this empirical thesis is that if there was an interest in 
respect both of the promisor and of the third party, then there ought to be an 
enforceable obligation. Now although the Romans themselves appear to have gone 
some way in accepting this logic,139 the procedural technicalities of the Roman 
stipulation nevertheless resulted in the third party not having an actio and this could 
prima facie give rise to an unprotected interest.140 The question arose therefore as to 
how one might indirectly give expression to such an interest. The problem was not 
insoluble and one way or another some third parties, both in Roman law itself and in 
the later civil law, were allowed to sue until, in the end, the alteri stipulari nemo 
potest concept was itself abandoned.141 Nevertheless what is important about this 
Roman law experience is the role assumed by the notion of an interest and the 
relationship between this concept and the availability of an actio. Interest became the 
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key concept not just with regard to the development of the alteri stipulari rule itself, 
but equally with respect to its exceptions and ultimate disappearance.142 
 
 
VII PENALTIES AND INTERESTS 
 
Mention has already been made of the role of an interest in a claim for debt rather 
than damages. However a quite recent case indicates how the notion of an interest can 
play a vital role in deciding whether or not a clause in a contract imposing a debt 
liability on a party who fails to conform to certain strict contractual terms is a penalty 
or not.143 
 
(a) Penalty versus legitimate interest 
 
 The case involved an action in debt for £85 by a car parking company against 
the owner of a car who had overstayed the two hour free car parking limit at a retail 
car park. The owner of the car argued that the debt was unenforceable either because 
it was a penalty or because it was an unfair term in a consumer contract. 
 
 The Supreme Court held that the debt was valid. Lord Neuberger reviewed the 
law on penalt\FODXVHVDQGFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKLVDUHDRIODZKDG³EHFRPHWKHSULVRQHU
of artificial categorisation, itself the result of unsatisfactory distinctions: between a 
penalty and genuine pre-estimate of loss, and between a genuine pre-estimate of loss 
and a deteUUHQW´144 He then asserted that: 
 
The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation 
which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any 
legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary 
obligation. The innocent party can have no proper interest in simply punishing 
the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative 
to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest 
will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore 
H[SHFW WKDW/RUG'XQHGLQ¶VIRXUWHVWVZRXOGXVXDOO\EHSHUIHFWO\DGHTXDWHWR




7KH NH\ QRWLRQ KHUH LV WKHQ WKDW RI D µOHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW¶ /RUG 1HXEHUJHU
subsequently concluded that although the £85 charge engaged the penalty rule the 
amRXQWZDVQRWDFWXDOO\DSHQDOW\EHFDXVHWKHFDUSDUNLQJFRPSDQ\³KDGDOHJLWLPDWH
LQWHUHVW LQFKDUJLQJWKHPZKLFKH[WHQGHGEH\RQGWKHUHFRYHU\RIDQ\ORVV´ And he 
continued: 
 
The scheme in operation here (and in many similar car parks) is that the 
landowner authorises ParkingEye to control access to the car park and to 
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impose the agreed charges, with a view to managing the car park in the 
interests of the retail outlets, their customers and the public at large. That is an 
interest of the landowners because (i) they receive a fee from ParkingEye for 
the right to operate the scheme, and (ii) they lease sites on the retail park to 
various retailers, for whom the availability of customer parking was a valuable 
facility. It is an interest of ParkingEye, because it sells its services as the 
managers of such schemes and meets the costs of doing so from charges for 
breach of the terms (and if the scheme was run directly by the landowners, the 
analysis would be no different).146 
 
Lord Neuberger did, however, qualify this interest analysis in saying that a car 
parking company could not charge what it liked. There had to be proportionality 
between the interests in play and the amount charged.147 
 
(b) Unfairness, good faith and legitimate interest 
 
 Lord Neuberger said that similar considerations applied to the second 
argument advanced by the car owner, namely that the term was unenforceable under 
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. The term, he said, was 
QRW XQIDLU ,W ZDV QRW XQIDLU ³EHFDXVH 3DUNLQJ(\e and the landlord to whom 
ParkingEye was providing the service had a legitimate interest in imposing a liability 
on Mr Beavis in excess of the damages that would have been recoverable at common 
ODZ´148 Indeed the presence of this legitimate interest prevented the imposition of the 
clause being contrary to good faith as required by regulation 5(1) of the 1999 
Regulations.  
 
 This good faith point is interesting because it is the key expression in the 
legislative text that, according to Lord Neuberger, prevents the term being unfair. 
According to Regulation 5(2) a WHUP ³shall always be regarded as not having been 
individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has 
therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term.´ 7KLV RI FRXUVH
suggests that the imposition of the car parking charge decided in advance and not as a 
result of any negotiations with consumers is prima facie unfair. Indeed its penalty 
nature ± that is to say the fact that it is a sum that is far in excess of any sum in 
damages payable by way of compensation ± would seemingly only add to this 
XQIDLUQHVV+RZHYHUWKHVHHVWDEOLVKHGFRQVXPHUµULJKWV¶DSSDUHQWO\FRQIHUUHGE\WKH
traditional rule against penalties and the 1999 Regulations, have now been defeated 
by the concept of an interest. If a penalty or seemingly unfair clause can be justified 
E\ D µOHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW¶ WKH GHEWRU¶V DSSDUHQW ULJKWV ZLOO GHIHU WR WKLV LQWHUHVW ,Q
RWKHUZRUGVWKHFDUSDUNLQJFRPSDQ\KDGDµULJKW¶WRDGHEWWKDWSULPDIacie would be 
unenforceable because they had a legitimate interest in imposing and enforcing it. The 
established law of penalties, if not the law on unfair terms, has, it would appear, been 
completely recast by this new case and its deployment of the notion of an interest. 
Penalty clauses are no longer automatically unenforceable since they are now subject 
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to the interests in play between not just the contracting parties but possibly a range of 
third parties as well.149 
 
 
VIII SECTIONAL INTEREST 
 
The interests attaching to (or orientated towards) the institutions of persons, of things 
and of actions do not in truth provide a complete or exhaustive map of legal interests. 
7KHQRWLRQFDQILQGLWVHOIEHLQJDSSOLHGWRPRUHHSKHPHUDOµWKLQJV¶VXFKDVthe public, 
commerce and justice. Legal texts contain, in other words, expressions such as the 
µSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶WKHµLQWHUHVWVRIMXVWLFH¶RUWKHµFRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVW¶150 As Professor 
&DQHKDVQRWHG³ZHRIWHQVSHDNRIDSHUVRQ¶VLQWHUHVWVRURIWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWLQa 
broader sense to mean simply objectives or states of affairs which are, or would be, to 
WKH SHUVRQ¶V RU WKH SXEOLF¶V DGYDQWDJH IRU H[DPSOH WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW LQ WKH GXH
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI MXVWLFH´151 These broader interests can, of course, be integrated 
within the institutional system in as much as they could be seen as extensions of the 
persona or res or the just the collectivisation of a mass of individual interests. But 
often they are contrasted with the individual interest. For example, it has been said 
WKDWWKH³FULPLQDOWULDOGRHVQRWH[LVWWRSURWHFWSULYDWHLQWHUHVWV´LW³H[LVWVDVSDUWRI
WKHHQIRUFHPHQWRIWKHFULPLQDOODZLQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW´152 2UDJDLQWKHUH³may be 
a public interest in disclosure greater than the private interest in secUHF\´153 
 
(a) Private rights and the public interest 
 
 Sometimes these broader interests can conflict and the court then has to walk a 
delicate tightrope between, say, the economic and political pressures.154 In one 
nuisance case the judge said: 
 
The problem with putting the public interest into the scales when deciding 
whether a nuisance exists, is simply that if the answer is no, not because the 
claimant is being over sensitive, but because his private rights must be 
subjugated to the public interest, it might well be unjust that he should suffer 
the damage for the benefit of all. If it is to be held that there is no nuisance, 
there can be no remedy at common law. As this case illustrates, the greater the 
public interest, the greater may be the interference. If public interest is 
considered at the remedy stage and since the court has a discretion, the 
nuisance may continue but the public, in one way or another, pays for its own 
benefit.155 
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One can see clearly in this extract how the notion of an interest can have an important 
role to play in legal reasoning. Of course, not all the cases are analysed directly using 
the concept of an interest, but the notion is often there in the background.156 Moreover 
the notion itself can be very problematic. Those who combine in order to threaten 
commercial or business interests may find themselves being accused of causing harm 
to the public interest,157 while the business enterprise which might appear to be 
threatening the public interest may find its activity receiving support on the basis of 
legitimate commercial interest.158  
 
(b) Commercial interest and the public interest 
 
 In fact the notion of commercial interest has found its way into the heart of 
(QJOLVKSXEOLFODZLQDVPXFKDVLWKDVEHFRPHDµFRQVWLWXWLRQDO¶ULJKWDYDLOable to the 
State. Take for example confidential information. The lack of any formal distinction 
between public and private law has led to government information being protected on 
WKH JURXQG RI µRZQHUVKLS¶ DQG µSULYDF\¶159 and private sector information being 
protected in the face of a strong public health interest.160 To expose on television to 
the general public that a certain drug might be dangerous would, according to one 
DSSHDOMXGJHEHD³EHWUD\DORIEXVLQHVVFRQILGHQFHV´161 Again the central concept in 
these kinds of cases is the notion of an interest. Confidential information is now a 
PDWWHU RI WZR GLVWLQFW ³LQWHUHVWV´ QDPHO\ SULYDF\ DQG VHFUHF\162 but these two 
LQWHUHVWVDUHLQWXUQVXEMHFWWRWKH³SXEOLFLQWHUHVW´ which may on occasions override 
the private interests.163 This battle of interests no doubt has the advantage of giving 
the judiciary much discretion in these matters.164 However it has to be asked if this 
µLQWHUHVW¶DSSURDFK165 ZLOOEHDEOHWRZLWKVWDQGWKHVKLIWWRZDUGVµULJKWV¶VWLPXODWHGE\
the Human Rights Act 1998.166 One answer is that the interest approach is very much 
capable of surviving if the notion of a right itself can effectively be reduced, by 
sleight of reasoning, to an interest. 
 
 Constitutional law can in consequence become subverted by the positive and 
negative aspects of the commercial interest.167 There are great dangers in this 
subversion. To give just one example, the British Foundry Association was reported 
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to have said, in relation to a Freedom of Information Campaign on the environment, 
that they doubted whether there is a genuine public demand for environmental 
LQIRUPDWLRQ7KHUHLVRQO\DGHPDQGVWLPXODWHG³E\SUHVVXUHJURXSVZLWKOLWWOHUHJDUG
IRU WKHHFRQRPLFFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHIXOILOPHQWRIWKHLUGHPDQGV´168 Here one can 
see that the Association was advancing the economic or commercial interest over 
what might be called the environmental interest. 
 
(c) Environmental interest 
 
 Yet what is interesting about the environmental interest is that it raises the 
question of the possibility of an interest attaching to a group of humans ± a diffuse 
persona ± who do not as yet exist. In other words, how should the law accommodate 
the interests of future generations? Today this is a fundamental debate in politics in 
the face of climate change. Where does the public interest lie? Does the immediate 
economic argument prove to be a more important public interest than the 
environmental argument? Even for lawyers this debate cannot really be resolved using 
the concept of a right, if only because it is not at all clear if is this an issue for civil, 
constitutional or commercial law. The key concept is the notion of an interest. 
 
 However in this debate the interest cannot easily be attached to a specific 
persona LW LV DWWDFKHG WR WKH QRWLRQ RI µHQYLURQPHQW¶ ZKLFK PD\ EH VHHQ LQ WZR
principal ways. It could be seen as part of a larger public interest and thus attaches to 
the populus DVDZKROHRUWRVD\DQDJHQF\RI WKHVWDWHVXFKDVD µ0LQLVWU\IRUWKH
EnvironPHQW¶2ULWFRXOGEHVHHQDVDIRUPRIµSURSHUW\¶DQGWKXVEHFRPHDNLQGRI
property interest. Each person has an interest in a healthy environment, this latter 
notion being seen as something capable of forming a claim in law. No doubt if the 
courts were to recognise that a healthy environment was something that could form 
the object of a claim the notion of an environmental interest would gradually 
transform into a right. 
 
 
IX MEDIATING ROLE OF AN INTEREST 
 
Accordingly an interest is a key concept because it has the capability of playing a 
mediating role. It is this mediating role that links the notion not just to the persona, 
res and actio structure of legal thought but also to legal reasoning. It is a link between 
substantive law, procedure and legal argumentation and justification. 
 
(a) Deconstructing and reconstructing facts 
 
 Sometimes this role can be positive, but it can sometimes be negative as well. 
In Macaura v Northern Assurance Co169 tKHSODLQWLIIVROGKLVWLPEHUDVVHWVWRKLVµRQH
PDQ¶ FRPSDQ\ LQ return for all its shares and then, in his own name, took out fire 
insurance on the timber assets. After a fire which destroyed the timber, the plaintiff 
tried to claim on the policy, but the insurance company successfully resisted the claim 
on the ground WKDW KH SHUVRQDOO\ KDG QR ³LQVXUDEOH LQWHUHVW´ LQ WKH DVVHWV RI WKH
company. His only res were the shares. This seems a strange decision when viewed 
from the position of an interest as a descriptive concept since it is clear that the 
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shareholder had a very real interest in the assets of the company just as a parent has an 
interest in the school grounds where his or her child is being educated. No doubt the 
decision can be justified in the narrow terms of insurance law, yet it indicates how 
interest can act as a negative exclusionary device even in private law. Interest is a 
means by which facts can be viewed holistically (commercial or consumer interests 
for example) or in individualistically (company and its sole shareholder) and thus is a 
device that helpVVKDSH WKHSDWWHUQRI WKHIDFWV WKHPVHOYHV µ,QWHUHVW¶ LQRWKHUZRUGV
mediates not just between persona, res and actio but also between each element that 
goes to make up the facts. 
 
 It is this ability to construct and deconstruct facts that gives the notion of an 
µLQWHUHVW¶LWVimportant dimension as a formal concept. As Professor Ost observes, the 
notion has the effect of undermining the traditional vision of law and fact. According 
to this traditional µclassical model¶ law is a matter of systematised and hierarchical 
rules waiting to be applied through the normative syllogism to sets of facts.170 When 
law is viewed from the position of interests, however, this classical model soon breaks 
GRZQ$VDUHVXOWRIWKH³VXEYHUVLYH´LQIOXHQFHRIWKHLQWHUHVWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ
fact and law becomes blurred and relative; facts become normative (and formalised) 
and rules become descriptive. The whole flow of the law starts to reverse and to 
double-back on itself while, at the same time, the frontiers between law and other 
disciplines break down. In the world of interests things are only relative; it is always a 
matter of weighing one interest against another within a social context where the 
objectivity of the judgment no longer has much meaning since everything is a matter 
of negotiation. The individual is swallowed up by the various class interests of rival 
social groups which themselves make up the social corps.171  
 
(b) Diluting tendency of English law 
 
 This view of law from the position of an interest is very much at odds with the 
official portrait of the legal rule in civil law systems, as Professor Ost indicates. Yet it 
is not, of course, at odds with the common law vision. The English lawyer will have 
QRSUREOHPLQHQYLVDJLQJ ODZDVDPDWWHURI LQGXFWLRQUDWKHU WKDQGHGXFWLRQ³IURP
WKH ERWWRP XS´172 or as a system whose frontiers are open to inputs from other 
disciplines.173 There are several reasons for this difference of conceptualisation. First, 
and foremost, the history of the civil law is largely a history of a movement towards 
µD[LRPDWLVHG¶ FRGHV RI VXEMHFWLYH ULJKWV174 According to this classic model the 
individual is the focal point of law and thus all law is to be viewed from the position 
of the legal subject (persona).175 No intermediate groups, as Ost points out, are 
allowed to perturb this vision of individual rights which exist as metaphysical 
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conceptions relating one to another through relations of co-ordination or 
subordination, never through integration.176 The common law remained untouched by 
the academic systematising tendency of humanism; the absence of common law 
faculties, before the end of the 19th century, left the common law to be shaped by 
practice and by a legal doctrine which thought in terms of lists of actions and 
procedural refinements.177 When common lawyers finally came to think in terms of 
rights, the most powerful theory was one that saw them as legally protected social 
interests.178 (YHQ WRGD\ WKH LGHD WKDW ULJKWV FDQ EH µREMHFWV¶ RI OHJDO FODLPV FDXVHV
difficulty179 and the notion of a right is not something that lends itself to abstract 
definition.180 Rights, even when they are recognised, tend on the whole, to be only 
relative and contingent and this, if one follows the Ost analysis of an interest, will 
effectively reduce the right to an interest.181 Rights, even with the incorporation of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, are things to be negotiated and traded one 
against another.182 ³5LJKWV KDYH DV WKHLU YRFDWLRQ WR MX[WDSRVH DQG WR DUUDQJH
WKHPVHOYHV LQ D KLHUDUFKLFDO RUGHU´ REVHUYHV 3URIHVVRU 2VW ³LQWHUHVWV RQ WKH RWKHU
hand have the tendency to merge and to dilute themselveV´183 
 
 One can certainly see this diluting tendency in the English case law.184 Take 
the Ashworth Hospital case185 where the Court of Appeal upheld a decision in which a 
newspaper was ordered to disclose the name of the hospital employee who had leaked 
certain medical records of one of the hospital patients. There is no doubt that such a 
disclosure of medical records amounted to a gross breach of privacy and Lord Phillips 
05 ZDV RI WKH YLHZ WKDW WKH KRVSLWDO LWVHOI ³KDG D FOHDU LQGHSHQGHQW LQWHUHVW LQ
retaining WKHLU FRQILGHQWLDOLW\´ +RZHYHU $UWLFOH  RI WKH &RQYHQWLRQ IRU WKH
protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states that everyone has the 
ULJKWWRIUHHGRPRIH[SUHVVLRQDQGWKDWWKLVLQFOXGHVWKHULJKW³WRUHFHLYHDQGLPSDUW
information and idHDV ZLWKRXW LQWHUIHUHQFH E\ SXEOLF DXWKRULW\´ 0RUH VSHFLILFDOO\
section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 lays down that disclosure is not to be 
RUGHUHGVDYH³LQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIMXVWLFH´2QHZRXOGKDYHWKRXJKWWKHUHIRUHWKDWWKLV
fundamental right would have protected the press from having to reveal a source. 
Indeed, a previous House of Lords decision ordering disclosure of sources on the 
basis of the interests of justice was overturned on further appeal to the European 
Court of Human Rights.186 The right of the journalist trumped the interest of justice. 
<HW RQ UHDGLQJ /RUG 3KLOOLSV¶V MXGJPHQW ± in fact on reading the argument for the 
defence ± it becomes clear that the case is not one about rights: 
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91. Mr Browne [counsel for the defendants] submitted that in a case such as 
this the English court has to follow a three-stage test. First it has to decide 
whether the interests of justice are engaged. Secondly the court has to consider 
as a fact whether disclosure is necessary to achieve the relevant ends of 
justice. Finally the court has to weigh, as a matter of discretion, the specific 
interests of the claimant against the public interest in the protection of 
MRXUQDOLVWV¶FRQILGHQWLDOVRXUFHV187 
 
 The central concept here is, quite evidently, that of an interest. One should not 
be surprised by this since this is the language of negotiation and not vindication. 
Moreover this interests approach is closely tied up with the nature of the remedy in 
issue: the plaintiffs were claiming disclosure through the remedy of discovery of 
documents and this remedy is essentially procedural. As Lord Reid has pointed out, 
WKH³FKLHIRFFDVLRQIRULWVEHLQJRUGHUHGZDVWRDVVLVWDSDUW\LQDQH[LVWLQJOLWLJDWLRQ´
EXW ³WKLV ZDs extended at an early date to assist a person who contemplated 
OLWLJDWLRQ´188 The result in the Ashworth case is that the press was not able to rely 
upon its right to resist the remedy of discovery. It was in effect defeated by a concept, 
WKHµLQWHUHVWVRI MXVWLFH¶ZKLFKDV/RUG'LSORFNRQFHVWDWHGLVXVHG³LQWKHWHFKQLFDO
sense of the administration of justice in the course of legal proceedings in a court of 
ODZ´189 Ubi remedium ibi ius. Or, to put it another way, legal rights are largely a 
matter of outcomes whose determination has been fought out on the terrain of 
remedies and procedure.190 On this terrain the key concept is not that of a right but of 
an interest. But, of course, this interest is as formalised a concept as a right, even if it 
does not have the same inherent normative power, and once formalised it finds itself 
in the same conceptual world as a right, thus able to take it on, and often, defeat it.191 
 
(c) Rights versus interests 
 
 This brings one to the second reason why the common lawyer has less 
difficulty than the civilian in conceptualising law from the interest position as 
analysed by Professor Ost. The common lawyer simply does not reason in terms of 
rights. To an extent this point is evident in a number of the decisions already 
analysed, but it has equally been dealt with in depth elsewhere.192 Suffice it to say, 
WKHUHIRUH WKDW ZKHQ (QJOLVK MXGJHV GR XVH WKH WHUP µULJKW¶ WKH\ GR VR XVXDOO\ LQ D
YHU\UHODWLYHZD\³7KHZRUGµULJKWV¶ LVDKLJKO\FRQIXVLQJZRUG´VDLG2UPURG/-
³ZKLFKOHDGVWRDJUHDWGHDORIWURXEOHLILWLVXVHGORRVHO\SDUWLFXODUO\ZKHQLWLVXVHG
ORRVHO\ LQDFRXUWRI ODZ´193 2QHPLJKWRIFRXUVH VD\ WKHVDPHDERXWDQ µLQWHUHVW¶
But two points need to be made with respect to this latter concept. First, an interest is 
much more easily identified as a source of reasoning in English law than on the 
FRQWLQHQWZKHUHWKHµODZ¶LVH[SUHVVHGIRUWKHPRVWSDUWLQFRGHVDQGWH[WV194 Ost, of 
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course, identifies an interest as a viable informal source of law, but in English legal 
reasoning, as some of the remedy cases show, an interest is virtually a formal building 
block in the construction of a judgment.195 
 
 6HFRQGO\ WKH WHUPLQWHUHVWEHLQJD µGHVFULSWLYH¶FRQFHSW IXQFWions as much 
within the facts as within the law and this gives it a certain empirical precision when 
compared to a right. Such precision may only be viable in the context of a particular 
set of facts, yet often one interest remains relatively clear vis-à-vis other identified 
interests within any such factual situation, even if the differences are difficult to 
resolve.196 This endows it with its particular quality in as much as it is capable of 
being a functionally active notion that brings together legal taxonomy, legal procedure 
and legal reasoning. 
 
 In the civil law, as Professor Ost illustrates, there are plenty of cases where 
LQWHUHVW KDV DQ H[SOLFLW UROH LQ WKH UHDVRQLQJ DQG WKH RXWFRPH <HW µLQWHUHVW¶ FRXOG
equally be used to illuminate those cases where the reasoning, on the surface, seems 
to be applying more formal normative concepts such as rights and obligations. As Ost 
REVHUYHVDQ\OHJDOV\VWHPWKDWUHTXLUHVDµOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW¶EHIRUHRQHFDQEULQJD
legal action to vindicate a right must be a system that, in the end, is one founded on 
interests.197 However the substance of these interests may not always be as empirical 
as one might think in that the conceptual force of an interest is provided by its 
relationship with other concepts within the institutional system. And it is this position 
in the model which goes far in actually defining the apparent empirical substance. It is 
a notion that prepares facts for the application of the law and makes those facts 
amenable to legal reasoning.198 
 
 In contrast tKHQRWLRQRIDµULJKW¶LQOHJDOGLVFRXUVHLVRIWHQLQDGHTXDWHDVERWK
a reasoning and an explanatory device. A right suggests an absolute normative 
HQWLWOHPHQWZKLFKµWUXPSV¶DOORWKHUFODLPVDQGREOLJDWLRQVLWJLYHVH[SUHVVLRQWRWKH
idea that an owner is entitled to his property ± RU WR HQIRUFH D FRQWUDFWXDO µULJKW¶ ± 
LUUHVSHFWLYH RI WKH VRFLDO DQG PRUDO PHULWV RI WKH RZQHU¶V FODLP <HW LQ PRVW OHJDO
disputes, or at least those beyond the law of property and debt, such an all-or-nothing 
approach is often unrealistic. An ultra-nominalist approach whereby claims are 
envisaged only from the viewpoint of a vindicating individual operating in a social 
vacuum is not reflected in the majority of legal decisions, at least in the appeal 
courts.199 What inspires a µULJKW¶ LV QHLWKHU D GHVLUH IRU GHVFULSWLRQ QRU D QHHG IRU
explanation. That is to say, a right is not a concept that can be used to describe the 
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methods employed by the judiciary nor can it be used to explain the process of legal 
reasoning. Instead it is a concept inspired by ideological legitimisation.200 
 
 No doubt legitimisation is as valid an epistemological tool as description or 
explanation; and so such legitimisation can be useful in legal reasoning. But the point 
to be made, in brief, is that social reality forces legal reasoning to slip from the 
metaphysical world of normative concepts towards a quasi-normative ± that is to say 
more descriptive ± world of legal notions which can operate within the facts 
themselves. What helps bind persona with res and with actio is a notion which, like 
them, functions at one and the same time within the world of fact and the world of 
norms. This is why the notion of an interest identifies itself both with the Gaian 
institutional structure and, often, with the concept of a right (rights as socially 
protected interests). Rights provide legitimisation, while interests ± seemingly ± 





What, then, are the claims being made with regard to interests? Why should interests 
be taken more seriously? There are several claims that have been advanced and, 
hopefully, fully supported by the cases and doctrine discussed or cited. The first is 
that the notion of an interest can be classified according to the classical institutional 
scheme of legal thinking (persons, things and actions) and this endows it with some 
kind of structural coherence. It is not just a matter of an alphabetical list. One is not 
claiming here that interests need to be rigidly classified according to a formal or 
metaphysical scheme from which judges can proceed to their solutions through 
deductive reasoning. It is simply to indicate that interests can be classified according 
to some rationalised orientations that could aid legal thought. It is to provide a kind of 
map. 
 
 The second claim is that the notion of an interest is a central one at the level of 
legal reasoning. The cases discussed indicate how it can be used to extend liability or 
to restrict it depending upon the facts and the views of the judges involved. The claim 
is that it provides a much more analytical tool in an epistemological sense than the 
notion of a right because it is a notion that is informed by the facts themselves ± it 
operates within the facts ± but has resonance in the world of law and legal thinking as 
well. 
 
 The third claim is linked to these first two. Because the notion of an interest 
can be seen to conform to the institutional structure of legal thought and yet it 
operates also at the level of fact it has a unique ability to inject legal conceptualism 
LQWRWKHIDFWVWKHPVHOYHV,WFDQKHOSPDNHWKHPµFRQIRUP¶WRWKHODZ,WLVDQRWLRQ
then, that plays an important role in the relationship between fact and norm. 
 
 In summary one might say this. It is this descriptive and explanative ability 
which form the key to the central role of an interest in legal reasoning. However this 
article has gone further than simply exposing the role of an interest behind many 
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DSSDUHQW µULJKWV¶ LW KDV VKRZQ WKDW WKHQRWLRQRI DQ LQWHUHVW LV QRW VRPHWKLQJ Wo be 
understood in terms of a list of different categories of interest defined strictly in terms 
of their empirical content. It is not a matter of abstracting from legal analysis a public, 
private, commercial, state, economic, expectation, restitutionary, reliance interest (and 
so on) and endowing each category of interest with a linguistic definition. It is a 
question of modelisation. That is to say it is a matter of seeing an interest as an 
important formal relational element that helps begin to represent the complexity of 
social fact within the structural model of persona, res and actio. It is this model which 
mediates between fact, law and reasoning and it has been the object of this article to 
discuss case law examples that illustrate this epistemological thesis. For the ideologist 
rights no doubt deserve to be taken more seriously than interests ± and indeed there 
are occasions where this must be so (for example human rights and, perhaps, property 
rights). But for the epistemologists the reverse is true. The notion of an interest gives 
a much more convincing insight into the reasoning of lawyers and judges and that is 
why it should be taken at least as seriously as rights. 
